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Surrogacy and the Utah Surrogate Parenthood Act:
The Need for an Unambiguous Statement
I.

INTRODUCTION

State legislatures have been slow to respond to the increasingly
popular 1 practice of surrogacy. 2 However, the publicity surrounding
the Baby M 8 litigation, and Judge Sorkow's decision that surrogate conI. A 1985 estimate placed the number of children born to surrogates at around 600 and
indicated that the numbers appeared to be growing. Gelman & Shapiro, Infertility: Babies by
Contract, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1985, at 74. See also Gest, Finally, A Ruling- 'M' is for Melissa, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Apr. 13, 1987, at 60. One commentator has suggested that
"[a]s surrogate motherhood comes out into the open and is heavily publicized, it comes to seem a
more legitimate and more available alternative to people wanting babies." M. FIELD, SuRROGATt:
MoTHERHOOD, 5 (1988)[hereinafter 'FIELD'].
2. For example, by early 1985 only 20 states had considered surrogate mother legislation, but
no legislation was enacted. See Pierce, Suroey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood,
II Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001, 3003 (Jan. 29, 1985) [hereinafter 'Pierce']. As of July 1987, no
state had yet banned the practice. Surrogate Parenthood: Legislative Update, 13 Fam. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1442 (july 14, 1987) [hereinafter 'Legislative Update']. But cf KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65509 (1984 ), wherein the Kansas legislature amended its adoption code to provide that the prohibition against advertising for adoption shall not extend to a prospective surrogate or a person seeking a surrogate.
For a description of the contemporary practice of surrogacy see infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
3. In re Baby M, 217 N.J.Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987), rev'd !09 N.J.
396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
In 1985, William Stern, a naturalized citizen and his family's sole survivor of the Holocaust,
entered into a surrogate contract with Mary Beth Whitehead. Elizabeth Stern, William's wife,
suffered from multiple sclerosis, and was unable to have children because she feared bearing a
child would exacerbate her illness. Mr. Stern was very interested in begetting a child so that his
family name might be preserved.
The surrogate contract provided that Mrs. Whitehead would be artificially inseminated, and
upon conception would carry the child to term, then surrender the child to Mr. Stern. She was
then required to renounce her parental rights in the child so Mrs. Stern could adopt the child. For
her efforts, Mrs. Whitehead was to be paid $10,000 plus all of her medical expenses.
Mrs. Whitehead gave birth to a girl on March 27, 1986, in New Jersey. What happened
following the birth is by now well known as it turned into a major media event. Mrs. Whitehead
refused to surrender the child to the Sterns and fled to Florida, where, for three months, she
evaded attempts by Mr. Stern to obtain custody of the child by living in roughly 20 different
hotels. Finally, the police found her, and forcibly removed the child from her.
After a 32 day trial, the trial judge held that the contract was valid and that sole custody
should be granted to Mr. Stern. Mrs. Stern was allowed to adopt the child. The trial judge found
that current state laws did not apply to surrogate contracts. The court reasoned that surrogacy was
constitutionally protected under the right to privacy, and that the agreement could be specifically
enforced.
On appeal, Judge Sorkow's decision was reversed by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The
court held the contract invalid because it conflicted with "(I) laws prohibiting the use of money in
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tracts are specifically enforceable;' has triggered legislative activity
throughout the nation. 5 The new bills have proposed everything from
criminalizing surrogacy to codifying the contractual relationship. 6
Other states have established commissions to study the practice. 7
The Utah Legislature recently became one of the few states to
adopt legislation prohibiting surrogate motherhood. 8 The Utah Surrogate Motherhood Act prohibits both commercial and gratuitous surrogacy as violative of public policy, provides criminal punishment for the
participants of a commercial surrogacy contract, and defines the status
of children born to surrogates.
The premise of this comment is that a combination of several statutes may have already prohibited surrogacy before the Utah Surrogate
Motherhood Act was enacted; nevertheless, the Act is a necessary clarification of the state's policy regarding surrogacy. Unfortunately, the Act
is automatically repealed in two years, leaving the official policy of the
state in just as much doubt as it was before the Surrogate Motherhood
Act was adopted.
This comment will examine the current practice of surrogate
connection with adoptions; (2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before
termination of parental rights is ordered or an adoption is granted; and (3) laws that make surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in private placement adoptions." Additionally.
the court held that public policy considerations rendered the contract invalid. The court also held
that the right to privacy did not include the right to procreate through a surrogate.
The court granted the Stern's custody of Baby M, who was named Melissa, refused to terminate the parental rights of Mrs. Whitehead or to permit the adoption of Melissa by Mrs. Stern,
and remanded the case for a determination of visitation and child-custody.
4. Baby M, 217 N.J.Super. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1176 (1987).
5. Since the trial court's decision in Baby M, at least 64 bills have been introduced in 26
jurisdictions. Legislative Update, supra note 2.
6. "The extant bills fall into essentially four categories: those that would codify the sort of
contractual relationship entered into by Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern to produce
Baby M; those that would permit surrogacy but render contracts for it unenforceable; those that
would forbid any payment to the surrogate mother; and those that would outlaw the process
altogether." 'Baby M' Decision Creates Flurry of Legislative Activity, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
1295 (Apr. 21, 1987). For a listing of legislative activity regarding surrogacy, see Legislative Update, supra note 2.
7. /d. In its 1988 session, the Utah Legislature established a Surrogate Parenthood Study
Committee. See infra note 159. Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas have also set up surrogacy study committees. Legislative Update, supra note 2.
8. The Utah Surrogate Parenthood Act will be codified at UTAH Coot~ ANN. § 76-7-204
(1989). For a complete discussion of the Utah Act, see infra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
To date only three other states have enacted surrogate legislation. Louisiana, Michigan and Nebraska have enacted legislation making surrogate contracts unenforceable. See LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2713 (West Supp. 1988); 1988 Mich. Legis. Serv. 189 (West)(to be codified at MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 722.851 (West 1988)); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 25-21,200 (Supp. 1988).
By judicial decision, the highest courts of Kentucky and New Jersey have also prohibited
surrogacy agreements. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky.
1986); In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987).
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motherhood (Part II), discuss the principal arguments both for and
against surrogacy (Part III), determine whether surrogate legislation
was necessary to prohibit surrogacy in Utah (Part IV) and analyze
Utah's Surrogate Motherhood Act (Part V).
II.

THE NEED FOR SURROGACY

Infertility affects a large segment of American society and has disappointed the parental aspirations of millions of American couples. 9 Infertility creates emotional distress and often creates marital conflict. 10
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade 11 adoption was a
feasible alternative to childlessness. However, the increased use of contraceptives,12 the availability of abortion on demand/ 3 and the
destigmatization of unwed or teenage motherhood 14 has severely reduced the number of adoptable, white, 111 healthy infants. 18 One study
9. It has been estimated that almost ten percent of married couples in the United States are
infertile. Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. (Rutgers
Univ.) I 07 ( 1982). One half of this number is attributable to the wife. New Bedfellows: Freedom
and Infertility, Sci. Nt:ws, May 31, 1980, at 341 [hereinafter 'Bedfellows']. A 1986 study by the
American Medical Association estimated that over 6 million American women have difficulty conceiving. Fuchs & Perreault, Expenditures for Reproduction-Related Health Care, 255 J. A.M.A.,
Jan. 3, 1986, at 76, 79. This number becomes more striking when one stops to consider that
infertility strikes about 14o/o of married women of child bearing age. Mosher & Pratt, National
Center for Health Statistics: Fecundity and Infertility in the United States, 1965-1982, Vital and
Health Statistics No. 104, at 5 (Feb. 11, 1985). A couple is considered infertile if the wife fails to
conceive after having been sexually active, without having used contraception, for a year. ld. at 4.
Infertility is not just a problem common to women, however. About one-third of couple infertility is attributable to the husband. Bedfellows, at 341. It has been estimated that one in ten men
are sterile. Immaculate Conceptions, NEW WEST, Aug. 25, 1980, at 28.
10. Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not So Nuvel After All, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28,
29 (1983) [hereinafter 'Robertson'].
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. The right of an individual to use contraception is well established. See Carey v. Population Servs. lnt'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13. It is estimated that the annual number of abortions performed in the United States exceeds one and one-half million. NAT'L CoMM. FoR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK 18 (1985)
[hereinafter 'ADOPTION FACTBOOK'j.
14. It has been reported that in California "[a]pproximately 97 percent of the unwed
mothers who carry their pregnancy to term are now keeping their children." Handel & Sherwyn,
Surrogate Parenting: Coming to Grips with tht Future, 18 TRIAL 57 (Apr. 1982). See also
Perry, Surrogate Contracts: Contractual and Constitutional Conundrums in the Baby "M"
Case, 9 j. LEGAL MEDICINE 104, 106-07 (1988) [hereinafter 'Perry'].
15. A study performed by the National Committee for Adoption found that "[b]lack children
constitute 14 percent of the child population, 34 percent of foster care, and 41 percent of children
free for adoption." ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 11. Consequently there are
"thousands of black and bi-racial children who wait for permanent homes" who may be adopted
in a relatively short period of time. ld. at 32.
16. Because adopting parents normally want to adopt a healthy infant, "special needs" children are frequently difficult to place. There is no shortage of the availability of these children. See
eneral/~ STAFF OF TH~: SuBCOMMITTEE ON CHILDREN AND YoUTH OF THE COMMITTEE ON
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estimated that in 1984 the chance of a childless couple adopting a
healthy infant was thirty-five to one. 17 Today, infertile couples have
few options to end their childlessness. 18 To many the most attractive,
indeed, the only feasible alternative is surrogacy. 19
Surrogacy most often represents an attempt by an infertile married
couple to bear a child who is biologically related to the father. 20 Typically, the infertile couple enlists the services of a surrogacy
agency 21 -usually called a surrogate broker-that is paid 22 to match
the couple with a woman who is willing to act as a surrogate. 23 The
surrogate 24 contracts 25 to be inseminated with the father's sperm, 26 to
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print !975). For example, in 1982
there were 274,000 "special needs" children available for adoption. Only 9,591 of these children
were adopted. ADOPTION HANDBOOK, supra note 13, at 41.
17. In 1984 over two million couples competed to adopt 58,000 infants Wilson, Adoption:
It's Sot Impossible, Bus. WK., July 8, 1985, at 112.
18. Childless couples must either "come to terms with childlessness; tolerate a very long period of waiting for an adoption placement; or pursue the adoption of a special needs child. Other
couples, frustrated and desperate, will buy babies from black market brokers, who apparently do a
brisk business in today's society." Comment, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for
Surrogacy, 65 N.C.L. REV. 127, 129 (1987) [hereinafter 'Commercial'Conceptions'J.
19. See Robertson, supra note 10, at 29.
20. Robertson, supra note I 0, at 29. In some cases, however, surrogacy is used because "the
couple wants to isolate the wife's genetic component because she carries a genetic disease." Keane,
Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S.ILL.U. L.J. 147, 147-48 [hereinafter 'Keane'].
This was one of the reasons why the Stern's sought the services of Mary Beth Whitehead.
21. In 1985 there were two dozen or so organizations providing surrogate mother services in
the United States. Wrong Mothers, Wrong Babies, EcoNOMIST, Apr. 20-26, 1985 at 63. They
appear to be full service organizations. They locate the surrogate by advertising through papers,
match infertile couples to willing surrogates, maintain a medical staff to supervise the artificial
insemination, and a legal staff to draft the contract.
22. The surrogate organization requires a fee of between $5,000 and S I 0,000 for the service
which they provide. Robertson, supra note 10, at 28-29. The Infertility Center of New York,
which was the surrogate organization involved in the Baby M case, received a fee of $7,500 from
William Stern. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 476, 537 A.2d 1227, 1271 (1988).
23. The surrogate is typically found by responding to newspaper advertisements. For example, Mary Beth Whitehead responded to the following ad: "SURROGATE MOTHER
WANTED. Couple unable to have child willing to pay $10,000 fee and expenses to woman to
carry husband's child. Conception by artificial insemination. All replies strictly confidential." Behind the 'Baby M' Decision: Surrogacy Lawyering Reviewed, 13 Fam. L. Rep. 3019 (BNA)(june
2, 1987). One surrogate organization in Southern California has published an extensive directory
of women who are willing to function as surrogates. Davis & Brown, Artificial Insemination by
Donor (AID) and the Use of Surrogate Mothers, 141 WEsT. ]. Mm. 127, 128 (1984) [hereinafter
'Davis & Brown'].
24. Typically these surrogate brokers limit surrogate candidacy to married women who have
already borne at least one healthy child. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at n.35. Limiting surrogacy to married women may also eliminate the perception that the arrangement is adulterous. In most states surrogacy is not adulterous unless the surrogate was impregnated through
sexual intercourse by a man other than her husband. In a minority of states, however, surrogacy
could possibly be adulterous because it involves the "surrendering of the reproductive function."
Rushevsky, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. (Rutgers Univ.)
107, 112 (1982). In addition a requirement of at least one birth is justifiable because it helps to
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carry the fetus to term, to relinquish the child immediately after birth
and to renounce all parental rights in the child by giving her advance
consent to the child's adoption by the wife of the natural father. 27 The
surrogate receives a fee, 28 that usually averages $10,000, 29 for her time
and inconvenience. 30 In addition, the father must pay for all of the expenses associated with the insemination and the pregnancy. The total
cost of the procedure may be anywhere between $20,000 and
$25,000. 31
In spite of its purported biblical origins, 32 surrogacy is still a
ascertain the physical ability of the surrogate to carry the child and her psychological ability to
give the child up for adoption. Comment, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 201-02 (1986) [hereinafter 'Redefining Mother'].
25. Surrogate contracts typically provide that the surrogate may not smoke, use alcohol or
drugs, or take aspirin without the overseeing obstetrician's written consent. These contracts also
provide that the surrogate cannot abort the fetus without the father's consent. A copy of the surrogate contract between William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead is found in Appendix A of the
court's decision in the Baby M case. Baby M, 109 N.J. at 470-74, 537 A.2d at 1265-69. See
generally Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263 (1982).
26. Ordinarily the surrogate is artificially inseminated with the father's sperm, although occasionally insemination will occur through intercourse. Artificial insemination is the manual introduction, by a physician, of a man's sperm into the surrogate's vagina. See generally W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 5-7 (2d ed. 1976). There are many different forms of artificial
insemination. A discussion of these is beyond the scope of this comment.
27. See generally W. WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DoMESTIC REI.ATIONS 443 (1984).
28. A fee is not always part of the agreement. Gratuitous surrogacy occasionally occurs, but
is a rare event. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at n.30.
29. A surrogate's fees normally range from $5,000 to $13,000. Some couples have indicated
that they are willing to pay as much as $40,000 to $50,000 for a surrogate. Comment, Surrogate
Mothering: Medical Reality in a Legal Vacuum, 8 J. LFGIS. 140, 147 (1981) [hereinafter, 'Surro-

gate Mothering'].
30. The fee arrangement is perhaps the only reason why surrogacy exists. Even surrogacy
proponents admit that "a prohibition on compensation for surrogate motherhood [would] be
equivalent to a prohibition of the practice," because few women would be willing to become a
surrogate without an attractive financial reward. Parker, Motivation of Surrogate Mothers: Initial
Findings, 140 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 117 (1983)[hereinafter 'Parker', Initial Findings']. See also
Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 373, 380 (1981) [hereinafter 'Black'].
31. This cost includes the fee paid to the surrogate and the surrogate broker, in addition to
the necessary medical and legal fees. See Comment, Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate
Mother's Right to "Rent Her Womb" for a Fee, 18 GoNZ. L. REV. 539, 542 (1983) [hereinafter
'Baby Sitting Consideration']. See also Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at n.37.
32. Proponents of surrogacy recall the story of Abraham and Hagar in an effort to legitimize
the practice. See generally Genesis 16: 1-6; 30:1-10.
While proponents of surrogacy attempt to legitimize the practice by citing its biblical origins,
they fail to recount the difficulties the arrangement created for the parties involved. For a discussion of those problems see Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 133-34. Similar problems
have also occurred with the modern practice of surrogacy. The Baby M case provides an excellent
illustration of the complexities involved with this practice. See supra note 3. The Malahoff-Stiver
dilemma is also instructive. See infra note 79.
Proponents also fail to recognize that an important difference between biblical surrogacy and
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rather new and infrequently used innovation; 33 nevertheless, the evidence suggests that its use is rising. 34 Before the popularity of surrogacy increases further, it is necessary that the states determine their
policy regarding the practice. To date, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska
and Utah are the only states to have come to grips with this duty. 311
Other states, by default, have left resolution of the important issues
involved in surrogacy to the courts. 38
Although most states do not have specific surrogacy legislation, 37
all states have laws governing adoption and baby-selling. 38 In the absence of surrogacy legislation, these are the laws that courts must use to
determine the rights of the parties to the surrogate contract in the event
of a breach. 31 Many commentators have argued that specific surrogacy
legislation is necessary in order to formally establish a state's policy
regarding surrogacy because adoption and baby-selling laws were not
intended to' 'cover the surrogate arrangement. 4 ° Furthermore, the absence of surrogate legislation allows the courts to disregard the unique
factors that prompted the surrogate contract and to treat an indivisible
transaction like a more typical adoption or child-custody battle. 41
Others argue that new legislation is unnecessary because present laws
can be construed to cover the practice. 42
contemporary surrogacy is that the rormer was a gratuitous arrangement and the latter is a commercial transaction where the surrogate receives a substantial ree. See infra note 29.
33. The ract that only about 600 children have been born by surrogate mothers indicates that
the practice is still very limited. Set supra note I. Set also Robertson, sujJra note I 0, at 28.
34. See supra note I.
35. See supra note 8.
36. In spite or legislative inaction, there is case law in several states that has either mildly
endorsed or banned surrogacy. See In rt Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988)(declared
surrogacy against public policy); Yates v. Keane, 14 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1160 (Mich. 1988)(surrogate contract invalid under Michigan law and United States Constitution); Surrogate Parenting
Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986)(surrogacy does not violate state adoption or
baby-selling laws, but a surrogate has the right to withdraw her consent to the contract for five
days after birth); Adoption or Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc.2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sur. Ct.
1986)(New York law does not presently preclude surrogacy, however this is a question for the
legislature).
37. See supra note I
38. Pierce, supra note I. Utah's baby-selling statute is discussed infra at note I 00.
39. There are three ways in which the surrogate contract can be breached by the surrogate.
She could reruse to be inseminated, she could exercise her right to an abortion, and she could
refuse to allow the child to be adopted. The rather can breach the contract by refusing to pay the
surrogate or refusing to accept the child.
40. Redefining Mother, supra note 24 at 192. They argue that adoption laws are inadequate
to handle the surrogate arrangement. For this reason courts are incompetent to deal with surrogacy because they can only do so on an ad hoc basis.
4 I. /d.
42. See Comment, Contracts To Bear a Child, 667 CALIF. L. Rt:v. 611 (I 978).
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THE ARGUMENTS OvER SuRROGACY

The arguments both for and against the practice of surrogacy are
compelling. Proponents argue that any governmental attempt to regulate or forbid the practice is unconstitutional because it involves a fundamental right that is inferred from the right to privacy. Opponents
argue that state tolerance of the practice violates public policy because
it makes a child the object of commerce. What follows is an analysis of
the basic arguments presented both for and against surrogacy.

A.

Surrogacy as a Constitutionally Protected Right

1.

The right of privacy

It is now firmly entrenched in our constitutional jurisprudence
that certain relationships are protected by the right to privacy.' 3 Proponents of surrogate motherhood contend that the right to obtain or to
bear a child by surrogacy is a fundamental right that is entitled to constitutional protection.•• This contention is grounded in a long line of
cases that protect the individual from unwarranted intrusions by the
state into matters that pertain to child-bearing and child-rearing.' 11
Both the right of an individual to be free from governmental interference in the use of contraceptives' 6 and the right of a woman to have an
abortion 47 are rights protected by the right to privacy.' 8 The Supreme
Court's decisions establishing these rights suggest that not only does an
individual have a constitutional right not to procreate, but that the constitution also protects the individual's right to procreate.' 9 Proponents
of surrogacy argue that the right to procreate necessarily implies the
43. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
44. Surrogacy is constitutionally justified because "the attempt involves an aspect of the marital relationship that the right to privacy has protected since its earliest articulations: raising children. Surrogate parenthood is generally nothing more than an attempt by couples who cannot bear
children by ordinary means to share in that experience." Keane, supra note 20, at 155-56.
45. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or.
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
453 (1972)
46. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
48. The origins of the right to privacy remain unclear. In Griswold, Justice Douglas said
that the right may be implied from the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. 381 U.S.
at 484-85. In Roe, Justice Blackmun said that the right is implied from the fourteenth amendment's "concept of personal liberty." 410 U.S. at 153.
49. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)(the right to procreate is a fundamental
right. To sterilize criminals convicted of certain felonies, while not sterilizing other criminals
guilty of equally grave offenses, is a denial of due process).
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existence of another right, namely the right to use any available means
to enjoy one's right of procreation. 110
If this characterization is true, any statute prohibiting surrogacy
would be an unconstitutional violation of the privacy 111 expectations of
both the surrogate mother and the man who hired her to bear his child,
unless the state could demonstrate that prohibiting the relationship
would further a compelling state interest and that the prohibition is
narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. 112

2.

Equal protection

Another constitutional impediment to prohibiting surrogacy may
be found in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 113
All states currently allow men to receive payment for sperm donations,114 yet all states also have baby-selling statutes that prevent a woman from selling her reproductive capability. 1111 Proponents of surrogacy
contend that the two services are indistinguishable. Both involve the
sale of that which is created by reproductive organs. 116 For a state to
50. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 139-40.
51. However, the right to privacy is not absolute. This was made quite clear in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S. Ct 2841 (1986), where the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the right
to privacy conferred a broad right of sexual privacy. The Court said,
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new
fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable
and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the 8onstitution.
!d. at 2846. In addition, Justice Blackmun noted in Roe that the right of privacy and the "unlimited right to do with one's own body as one pleases are not the same." Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
52. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977). Admittedly, this is a test
which the government can seldom pass. However, opponents of surrogacy argue that surrogacy
does not involve the right of privacy, therefore, any regulation of the practice need only be rationally related to a legitimate government objective. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, 581-84 (1978). Opponents argue that the right of privacy is not an issue with
surrogacy because the right "is intended to guarantee the right of an individual to control his or
her own reproductive faculties, not to commission and monitor the pregnancy of a third party."
Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 152. Additionally, the parties to the surrogate contract
are not, as Roe requires, "isolated in [their] privacy." /d. at 141.
53. The equal protection clause provides that "[n)o State shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
54. Sperm donors usually receive as much as $20 to $35 for a vial of sperm. Curie-Cohen,
Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States,
300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 586-87 (1979).
55. See supra note 38.
56. Black, supra note 30, at 380. This argument ignores that there is a difference between
semen donation, pregnancy and childbirth. "Pregnancy and childbirth are hazardous, time-consuming, painful conditions which few women can be expected to experience for the sake of someone else unless they receive meaningful compensation." Keane, supra note 20, at 153. However, if
a surrogate does have a greater risk than does a sperm donor then perhaps the surrogate and
sperm donor are not similarly situated, and there is no equal protection argument.
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permit a man to receive compensation for the sale of his reproductive
capability but deny a woman the same opportunity is to discriminate on
the basis of sex, which is forbidden under the equal protection clause
unless the prohibition is substantially related to an important governmental objective. 117

B.

Surrogacy as Violative of Public Policy

Opponents of surrogacy find many of its aspects objectionable.
Most of those objections are grounded in public policy concerns.

1.

Public policy considerations

a. Baby-selling statutes. Opponents of surrogacy are perhaps most
offended by the practice because of the large fees that are paid to the
broker and the surrogate mother. 118 Proponents of the practice argue
that surrogacy is indistinguishable from a personal services contract or
a rental agreement, and that the fee paid to the surrogate can be either
considered as payment for nine months of her services or as a rental fee
for nine months use of the surrogate's womb. 119 Opponents, however,
assert that the label given the contract does not disguise the fact that the
transaction is, in essence, one for the sale of a child. 60 There are several
factors that point to this conclusion.
Baby-selling statutes typically provide that a person who sells or
attempts to sell a child for any purpose, including in connection with
an adoption, is guilty of a criminal offense. 61 The surrogate contract
57. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Gender based discrimination is only entitled to an
intermediate level of scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Accordingly, laws which discriminate on the basis of gender satisfy the clause if they are substantially related to an important
governmental objective. More recently, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to increase the
scrutiny given to gender based discrimination, by adding the requirement that there must be an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for the gender based classification. Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982).
58. They argue that the payment of fees for the birth of a child commodifies the child, oppresses the mother, and denigrates the value of human life. See generally Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 142-47.
59. See generally Baby Sitting Consideration, supra note 31.
60. FIELD, supra note 1, at 164 n.5. "Most contracts . . provide for no payment to the
mother if she miscarries, even after many months of pregnancy; instead they condition payment
upon the handing over of a live child. Clearly, such restrictions are incompatible with the characterization of payment for "services" or "rent". The contract involved in the Baby M case is indicative of this. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 470-74, 537 A.2d 1227, 1265-69 (1988). Considering
this, the court said, "[i]t strains credulity to claim that these arrangements, touted by those in the
surrogacy business as an attractive alternative to the usual route leading to an adoption, really
amount to something other than a private placement adoption for money." /d. at 1241.
61. See for example the discussion of Utah's baby selling statute, infra notes 100-07 and
accompanying text. Payment of a woman's reasonable maternity, medical and necessary living
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itself illustrates that the contract is one for the sale of a child instead of
for rent or personal services. Surrogate contracts typically provide that
the surrogate's fee will be withheld until the surrogate has fully complied with the contract by terminating her parental rights in order to
facilitate adoption. 62 In addition, these contracts also provide that if the
child is stillborn the agreement terminates even though her services
have been fully rendered. 63 Under this arrangement it is virtually impossible to separate the services component of the contract from the
goods component. 64 If the child is not delivered in good condition, the
money is not paid, even though the service has been performed. 65
Therefore, to argue that this transaction does not constitute baby selling
is misleading because it ignores the substance of the agreement. 66
Another fact points to the transaction as one for the sale of a baby
instead of one for personal services. Research has shown that women
ordinarily will not become surrogates unless they are paid. This, coupled with the contractual provisions, suggests that the surrogate fully
realizes that she is being paid solely to manufacture and market a
good. 67
b. Lack of voluntary or informed consent. Surrogacy opponents
also argue that the fee arrangement exploits surrogates. 68 They argue
expenses is generally held not to violate baby-selling statutes. Note, Developing a Concept of the
Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 Gm. L.J. 1283 n.54
(1984) [hereinafter 'Surrogate Act'].
62. See supra note 60. See B. Atwell, Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of Incompatibility,
62-71 (unpublished manuscript available in Journal of Public Law office, Brigham Young Cniversity, J. Reuben Clark Law School) [hereinafter 'Atwell'], where the author argues that the
surrogate is paid a "success fee" which clearly constitutes baby-selling.
63. Atwell, supra note 62.
64. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 142-48.
65. Atwell, supra note 62 and accompanying text.
66. Perhaps a more convincing argument can be made that the transaction involves, not the
sale of a child, but rather the sale of parental rights to a child. There is little practical difference.
As one commentator has noted, the "[s]ale of [a surrogate's] parental rights is the equivalent of
sale of the child." Means, Surrogacy v. The Thirteenth Amendment, IV N.Y. LAw ScH. HuM.
R-rs. ANN. 445 (1987) [hereinafter 'Means'].
67. There are, however, a few women who are willing to function as surrogates for purely
altruistic reasons. They are motivated out of compassion and want to give infertile couples "the
gift of life". Parker, Initial Findings, supra note 30 at 118. Mary Beth Whitehead claimed this
was her motivation in becoming a surrogate. This statement, however, lacks credibility because she
became a surrogate at the same time the second mortgage on her house was being foreclosed. In re
Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 440, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (1988). Some women, many of whom are
single, wish to become surrogates to experience pregnancy without having to accept the responsibilities attendant with motherhood. Robertson, supra note I 0, at 35. Others become surrogates to
atone for a prior abortion and attempt to eliminate any feelings of guilt. Parker. Initial Findings,
supra note 30, at 118. However, it is clear that the vast majority of surrogates participate in
surrogacy for the money. /d.
68. See generally Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18. See also In re Baby M, 109 N.J.
396, 434-44, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246-50 (1988).
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that the promise of high fees lure many into the arrangement without
fully appreciating the consequences of the contract. 69 Despite the fact
that she consents to give up her child, the promise of $10,000 may
prevent an impoverished70 surrogate from making a totally voluntary
decision. 71 Indeed, any consent that is given before the child is actually
delivered, let alone conceived, is not voluntary or informed with regard
to the child because it is impossible to predict how the surrogate will
feel after the child is born. 72
c. The child as a commodity. Perhaps the most important objection
to the fee arrangement is that it degrades human life because it creates
the opportunity for the parties to treat the child as a commodity. 73 The
child is not created for his own sake, nor are the child's best interests
considered; 74 indeed, they cannot be before the child is born. 711 The only
factor considered is that of promoting the happiness of an infertile
couple. 76 The substantial investment77 that the father makes in his
child only commercializes the child further because that investment
brings with it an expectation of product quality. 78 Nothing prevents a
disappointed father from rejecting a deformed or retarded infant when
his expectations are not met. This possibility was tragically illustrated
in a 1983 surrogacy agreement. 79
69. "This financial incentive may be sufficient to induce a woman to enter into the surrogacy
agreement - an agreement she probably would not otherwise make and one that she may later
regret." Atwell, supra note 62, at 60.
70. A study of the motivations of potential surrogates revealed that most were financially
needy. Parker, Initial Findings, supra note 30, at 118.
71. See infra notes 121-40 and accompanying text.
72. /d.
73. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 142-48.
74. But see Keane, supra note 20, at 156, which suggests that it is perhaps a good thing that
normal parental motivation is not subject to the scrutiny given to a surrogate's motivation. Indeed,
is a child ever created because his parents are looking out for the child's best interests'
75. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
76. Often the reason that the couple is unable to have children is because the wife has postponed child-rearing to pursue professional aspirations. FIF.l.D, supra note 1, at 60-61.
77. Although it varies from organization to organization, a couple will pay on the average
$25,000 for a child born by a surrogate. This cost includes the fee paid to the surrogate and the
baby broker as well as the surrogate's medical costs, psychological fees, legal fees, life insurance
costs, etc. Baby Sitting Consideration, supra note 31, at 542-43.
78. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 146.
79. In 1982, Judy Stiver and Alexander Malahoff entered into a surrogate contract. Under
the terms of the contract, Mrs. Stiver was to abstain from sexual intercourse until she conceived by
artificial insemination. In January 1983, she gave birth to a boy. The child, however, was born
with microcephaly, the symptom of which is an abnormally small head. Microcephaly frequently
results in mental retardation.
Malahoff refused to accept the impaired child. He claimed it was not his, and demanded
blood tests to determine the child's paternity. The Stivers also did not want the child. Blood tests
were administered and the results announced on the Donahue television program. The tests indicated that Malahoff was not the father. Malahoff was relieved but had already decided that if he
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Contractual provisions

Opponents of surrogacy also find the contractual provisions of the
arrangement offensive. They claim that the contract violates public policy because it purports to eliminate the surrogate's right to an abortion
and because it attempts to circumvent adoption laws.
a. Abortion. Typically, surrogate contracts provide that the surrogate waives her right to abort. 80 Opponents of surrogacy ironically 81
argue that the purported waiver of a woman's fundamental right to an
abortion is invalid. 82 They argue that if a husband cannot veto his
wife's decision to have an abortion, 83 this veto power cannot be given to
a father in the surrogate context. 84 Furthermore, specific performance
of this contractual provision constitutes state action which violates the
surrogate's right to privacy 811 and the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude. 86
b. Prenatal consent to adoption. The surrogate contract also violates public policy by attempting to terminate the parental rights of the
mother before those rights have even vested. 87 Many states preclude
prenatal consent to adoption, generally requiring a certain number of
days after birth before the mother may voluntarily terminate her parental rights. 88 Indeed, even after those rights have been terminated, termiwas the father he would give the child up for adoption. Later Mr. Stiver revealed that in a
previous marriage he had fathered a mi<-rocephalic child who had died.
This is a tragic example of a situation where a child was viewed as a commodity. It is a
tragedy not only because of the reaction of the parents, (there is current!} a multimillion dollar
lawsuit pending between Malahoff and the Stivers) but more importantly because no one was
concerned with the interests of the child. See Surrogate Act, supra note 61. at 1285-86.
80. "Abortions are not generally allowed [under the contract] unless such action is necessary
for the physical health of the surrogate." Baby Sitting Consideration, supra note 31, at 544.
81. Many opponents of surrogacy feel that the practice should be prohibited in order to
preserve the traditional family structure. See Perry, supra note 14, at 108. It is ironic that they
invoke the right of privacy, which has the potential of forever altering the traditional family structure, to argue that surrogacy is against public policy. Additionally, it is ironic that both proponents
and opponents use the right of privacy to justify their views.
82. See generally Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate
Mothers, 99 HARV. L. R.:v. 1936, (1986) [hereinafter 'Rumpelstiltskin'].
83. "Clearly since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion ... the State cannot dele'' Planned
gate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
84. Rumpelstiltskin, supra note 82, at 1940
85. Comment, Constitutional Analysis of the Baby M Decision, 11 HARV. WOMEN's L.J.
19, 51 (1988) [hereinafter 'Constitutional Analysis'].
86. The Thirteenth Amendment provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude .
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction'' U.S. CaNST.
amend. XIII, § l. Forcing the surrogate to bear a child which she does not want to bear would
place her in involuntary servitude to the father.
87. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
88. Atwell, supra note 62, at 31-34.
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nation may be revocable for several months. 89 In addition, many states
have specific procedures that must be followed before a termination of
parental rights is permitted. 90 Typically, those procedures provide that
absent some showing of parental neglect parental rights will not be terminated,91 because it is the policy of the state to leave children with
their natural parents. 92 To allow termination to occur without complying with the statutory provisions is to deny the surrogate her constitutionally protected liberty interest in her child. 93 The surrogate contract,
however, purports to circumvent this legislative intent through a simple
contract.

3.

Surrogacy v. adoption

Opponents also argue that because the long term effects of surrogacy on the participants are unknown, the practice should be prohibited. Surrogacy could affect the surrogate's mental health, 94 alter her
relationship with her other children 911 and create difficulties for the
adopting couple as well. 98 In addition, the transaction may dramatically
affect the child who is the subject of the surrogate transaction. Proponents of surrogacy are likely to deny that learning one was conceived
through a surrogacy arrangement is any more stressful than learning
that one was adopted. There may be some merit to this argument.
89. "[M]any states provide that even if the biological parents give consent after the child's
birth, that consent may be revoked with relative ease within a short period of time." /d. at 32. See
also In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 429-31, 537 A.2d 1227, 1244 (1988).
90. UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-3a-48 (1985). For a description of the effect of this statute on
surrogacy see infra notes I 00-07 and accompanying text.
91. ld.

92. See State ex rei Winger, 558 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1976).
93. See generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979).
94. The surrogate may feel a deep sense of loss and guilt upon relinquishing the child. Depression may last for weeks, Robertson, supra note I 0, at 29, and may necessitate psychiatric
counselling. Davis & Brown, supra note 23, at 129.
95. Presumably other children of a surrogate mother must be told something when the
mother does not come home from the hospital with a baby. A child is not likely to understand if he
is told that his mother gave the baby away. Indeed, he may begin to question whether he, like his
sibling, is equally eKpendable. See generally Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate Parenting, 13
HASTINGS CENTER RF:P. 35 (1983) [hereinafter 'Krimmel'].
96. The natural father may "concentrate his love on the child, thereby excluding the wife
from the familial relationship. Alternatively, as the child matures the father may resent the child
or develop guilt feelings with the realization that his satisfaction in the child might not be shared
by his spouse." Surrogate Mothering, supra note 29, at 105. On the other hand the adoptive
mother is likely to feel guilty about her nonpartictpatory role in giving the child life and may
"develop feelings of jealousy and animosity for the [child]." !d. at 154. Both parents, however,
must be prepared to cope with having been participants in a "relationship that many consider to
be immoral or deviant." Robertson, supra note 10, at 29.
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Adoptees typically have difficulty adjusting to this knowledge. 97 However, an adopted child and a child born to a surrogate may not be similarly situated because the child born to a surrogate bears the added
burden of knowing that her mother gave her up for a $10,000 fee.
Surrogacy is not the same as adoption. They may appear to be
similar, nevertheless, they have different purposes. 98 Justifying the
practice of surrogacy by its similarity to adoption ignores their difference. One commentator has expressed the difference as follows:
Traditional adoptions are child rescue operations, not palliatives for
disappointed parents. The current adoption system allocates lives in
being; the child is already in crisis. In short, adoption poses the least
detrimental alternative for the child. In marked contrast, the host
mother in a surrogate parenting contract conceives the child intentionally for the very purpose of exchanging the child for money. Rather
than centering on the needs of a child, the surrogate model exists primarily to satiate the psychic and financial needs of adult parties. 99

This is perhaps one of the most compelling reasons why surrogacy
should not be condoned.

IV.

ANALYSIS OF UTAH LAW

Whether the Surrogate Motherhood Act was needed depends on
the present status of surrogacy under Utah law. An analysis of the existing laws indicates that surrogacy was prohibited even before the
adoption of the Act.

A.

Baby-Selling

Utah law specifically prohibits the sale of children 100 by providing
that persons guilty of selling or attempting to sell or otherwise dispose
of a child for money or other consideration are guilty of a third degree
97. See generally j. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS: THE EXPERIENCES OF ADOPTED
(1973).
98. Krimmel, supra note 95, at 35.
99. Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 144-45.
100. UTAH Com: ANN. § 76-7-203 (1973) provides:
Any person, while having custody, control, or possession of any child, who sells, or
disposes of, or attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in consideration of the
payment of money or other thing of value is guilty of a felony of the third degree;
provided, however, this section shall not make it unlawful for any person, agency, or
corporation to pay the actual and reasonable maternity, connected medical or hospital
and necessary living expenses of the mother preceding and during confinement as an
art of charity, so long as payment is not made for the purpose of inducing the mother.
parent, or legal guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to the adoption, or cooperate in the completion of the adoption.
!d. There is no case law interpreting this statute.
PEOPLE
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felony .101 An exception allows for the payment of the actual and reasonable expenses connected with the pregnancy and birth of the child,
however, such payment must be charitable in nature. 102 Therefore, it
appears that the statute is violated if payment of the bills associated
with the pregnancy are for the purpose of inducing the mother to cooperate in the placement of the child for adoption.
This statute alone may prohibit the entire surrogacy arrangement.103 Under the surrogate contract the surrogate is promised a fee to
release the child to the father. It appears that if she complies with the
contract that she has violated the statute. However, the statute only
prohibits commercial surrogacy. A woman who is willing to bear the
child gratuitously does not violate the statute.
But what about the father? 104 The statute speaks only in terms of
the seller of the child; it appears that under this statute the father cannot be prosecuted for having purchased the baby 105 It can be argued
that because his payment for the surrogate's medical expenses are not
charitable that the statute also reaches his purchase. However, it can
just as easily be argued that even though the statute precludes a person
paying medical expenses, if such payment is for the purpose of inducing the mother to place the child for adoption, that the statute fails to
specify any punishment for doing so.
However, the fact that the surrogate may be prosecuted under this
law and the father cannot may be of little significance. The fact that
101. ld. The maximum penalty for a third degree felony is five years imprisonment.
ConE ANN. § 76-1-201 (1983).

UTAH

102. The requirement of a charitable purpose appears to place a motivational limitation on
the person paying the expenses. It appears that unless this payment was motivated out of a genuine concern for the woman's health, safety or financial well being, thilt the statute would be violated. This would preclude the natural father in a surrogacy contract from poying the surrogate
mother's medical expenses, because his motivation does not go to the mother, rather it goes solely
to the child produced under the contract.
103. But see Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S. W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986)(surrogacy does not violate the state's baby-selling law).
104. There is some question as to whether baby-selling statutes apply in this context. Arguably, these statutes were enaned to prevent someone other than the natural father from purchasing
his own child. It has been questioned whether the father can violate these statutes at all because it
seems axiomatic that one cannot buy that which is already his. However, the agreement could be
characterized as one for the sale of parental rights, which may violate the statute. See generally
Means, supra note 66 and accompanying text. Clearly these statutes would apply if the natural
father's wife were the party to the contract. Therefore, the reason the wife is always left out of the
contract between the father and the surrogate is to eliminate the appearance of a third party
buying a baby.
105. Failure to direct this statute at the purchaser of the child makes only the sale of the
child a criminal violation. Because the purchaser is under no threat of prosecution. 1t is coneeivable that he eould simply raise the price he is willing to pay for the child to compensate the
surrogate for the risk of ineurring a criminal penalty for selling the child.
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only one of the parties to the transaction has criminal liability has the
effect of drastically limiting the transaction, which is arguably the purpose of the statute anyway. Therefore, it appears that this statute legally and practically prevents commercial surrogacy from taking place
in Utah. 106 However, it probably does not prevent gratuitous surrogacy,
especially if the surrogate pays her own medical expenses. 107

B.

Surrogacy as an Independent Adoption

Arguably, surrogacy is merely a form of independent adoption because the ultimate goal of the arrangement is to make the adopting
couple the legal parents of the child created under the contract. 108
Many states discourage independent adoptions 109 in favor of requiring
persons wishing to adopt to work through a state licensed agency. Utah
law, however, permits independent adoptions by permitting unlicensed
individuals to assist in bringing the parties together. 110 But, independent adoption is permitted only as long as "no payment, charge, fee,
reimbursement or expense, or exchange of value of any kind, or promise or agreement to make the same [is] made for that assistance." 111
This statute seriously restricts surrogacy arrangements by precluding the use of the surrogate broker; indeed, to the extent the broker is
106. The lack of a law defining the rights of individuals who avail themselves of artificial
insemination is yet another legal impediment to surrogacy in Utah. Under Utah law there is a
presumption "that a child born to the wife during marriage is the legitimate offspring of herself
and her husband." Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 395, 518 P.2d 687, 689 (Utah 1974). The
child born to a surrogate, however, is not the child of the surrogate's husband, and it may be
difficult for the surrogate's husband to establish that the child is not his because of Utah's adherence to the Lord Mansfield Rule which, in effect, prevents either spouse from giving testimony
that would bastardize the child. Id. Other states have eliminated this problem by enacting laws
governing artificial insemination. These laws provide that if the husband consents to his wife
being artificially inseminated that any child born after the artificial insemination is treated as if it
were the child of the husband. See generally Comment, Artificial Insemination and the Law,
1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 935. Surrogacy contracts typically state that the surrogate's husband does
not consent to the artificial insemination in order to rebut the implications of such laws.
107. But few women would be willing to do this. See Black, supra note 30.
108. Atwell, supra note 62, at 16.
109. Several commentators have criticized independent adoptions because more abuses
tend to occur through independent adoptions than through agency adoptions. For example, a child placed for adoption through an independent procedure is more likely to
become a victim of the black market. Moreover, some studies conclude that there is a
greater risk that the biological parents will not receive proper counseling regarding the
decision to place the child for adoption. There also appears to be a greater risk that the
placement will not be permanent due to some intervening problem.
Atwell, supra note 62, at 20-21.
110. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 62A-4-202(2)(a)(l988).
Ill. /d. The statute does not, however, preclude "payment of fees for medical, legal, or other
lawful services rendered in connection with the care of a mother, delivery and care of a child, or
lawful adoption proceedings .... "UTAH CoDE ANN. § 62A-4-202(3)(1988).
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used, the statute may totally prohibit the practice. 112 Under the typical
surrogacy contract, the individual or organization that matches the surrogate mother with the infertile couple receives a substantial fee for its
services. 113 Because the surrogate contract itself is ultimately consummated for the sole purpose of creating an adoptable child, it is inescapable that the surrogate broker's fee includes a healthy profit to the
broker for bringing the two parties to the contract together. 114 This,
however, is expressly forbidden under Utah's Child Placement Law 1111
and results in both criminal and civil penalties. 116 Commercial surrogacy, therefore, is impermissible because the intermediary receives an
illegal fee.

C.

Termination of Parental Rights

The laws governing the termination of parental rights are also fatal to surrogacy in Utah. Surrogate contracts purport to terminate the
parental rights of the surrogate mother in order to facilitate the adoption of the child by the father's wife. Such an agreement is unenforceable under Utah law! 17 Only a court may decree a termination of parental rights! 18 A termination decree may be ordered only after a
112. It is doubtful whether surrogacy would occur but for the services provided by the surrogate broker. See Black, supra note 30.
113. The fee usually averages between $5,000 and $10,000. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
114. The surrogate broker's fee also includes the costs of artificially inseminating the surrogate and drawing up the surrogate contract. See contract between William Stern and Infertility
Center of New York in Appendix B of the Baby M case. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 475-78,
537 A.2d 1227, 1271-73 (1988).
115. See supra note II 0 and accompanying text.
116. UTAH Com: ANN. § 62A-4-203 (1988). This section provides:
(1) The division or any interested person may commence an action in district court to
enjoin any person, agency, firm, corporation, or association violating Section 62A-4202.
(2) A county attorney or the attorney general shall institute legal action as necessary to
enforce the provisions of Section 62A-4-202 ...
(3) In addition to the remedies provided in Subsections (1) and (2), any person, agency,
firm, corporation, or association found to be in violation of Section 62A-4-202 shall
forfeit all proceeds identified as resulting from the transaction, and may also be assessed
a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. Every act in violation of
Section 62A-4-202, including each placement or attempted placement of a child, is a
separate violation.
/d.
117. Utah law indicates that there is a strong, but rebuttable, presumption that the interests
of the child are best served by remaining in the custody of his natural parents. Therefore, termination is not appropriate unless clear and convincing evidence indicates otherwise. See In re Castillo,
632 P.2d 855 (Utah 1981); State ex rei. Winger, 558 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1976).
118. "A termination of parental rights may be ordered only after a hearing is held specifically on the question of terminating the rights of the parent or parents." UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-
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hearing where parental unfitness, abandonment or failure to show the
normal interest of a natural parent 119 is shown by clear and convincing
evidence. 120 The law does provide for termination upon voluntary petition of one or both of the parties, however, this does not eliminate the
hearing requirement.

D.

The Utah Adoption Law

Finally, surrogacy is clearly prohibited under the Utah Adoption
Law. 121 A critical feature of the surrogate contract is the surrogate's
consent, long before conception, to relinquish her parental rights in the
child and to permit it to be placed for adoption following its birth. This
agreement violates the Utah Adoption Law in several respects.
The statute provides that "[a] child cannot be adopted without the
consent of each living parent having rights in relation to said child ...
122
."
Consent must be given in the presence of a district court judge. 123
The purpose of this requirement is to assure the court that consent is
both informed and voluntary. 124 Surrogate contracts violate this requirement. The contract purports to obtain the surrogate's consent to
the adoption long before the child is conceived. Such advance consent is
neither informed, voluntary nor possible under the statute.
Before conception, indeed, before birth, the surrogate lacks sufficient information to make an informed choice. 12 ~ Only after the surrogate has given birth can she truly make an informed choice to place her
child for adoption. Until the child is born the mother is unaware of the
bond that has developed between her and her child. 126 Only after she
3a-48 (1985).
119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-48(1)(1985).
120. Before a state may irrevocably terminate the rights parents have in their children, due
process requires that the state must support its allegations by at least a clear and convincing
evidence standard. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855 (Utah
1981).
121. UTAH CoDE ANN.§§ 78-30-1 to 78-30-18 (1953).
122. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-30-4(1)(1981).
123. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-8 (1953). The statute also provides that if the person whose
consent is necessary is not in the county, the court may appoint a commissioner to take her written
consent and "[t]he commissioner shall explain to such person the legal significance of such consent,
and shall certify to the court his findings as to whether the consent is freely given."
124. See Taylor v. Waddoups, 121 Utah 279, 241 P.2d 157 (Utah 1952).
125. "How well can a surrogate mother applicant understand and comprehend, prior to the
artificial insemination how she will feel when she relinquishes the child'" Parker, Surrogate
Motherhood, Psychiatric Screening and Informed Consent, Baby Selling, and Public Policy, 12
BuLL. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY LAW 21, 27 (1984).
126. Gaffney, Maternal-Fetal Attachment in Relation to Self-Concept and Anxiety, 1982
MATERNAL-CHILD NuRSING J. 91. "Attachment begins with the ... sensations created by fetal
movement which validate the mother's awareness of another~an awareness that continues
throughout pregnancy." Id. at 92.
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has held her baby can she even partially comprehend the consequences
of permanently severing her parental relationship with that baby. 127
Hence, any consent given before the child is born is necessarily
uninformed. 128
Generally, the expectations of competent parties who have entered
into a contract will be enforced. 129 However, freedom of contract is a
qualified right. 130 Agreements may be unenforceable if one of the parties was unduly influenced to enter into the agreement. 131
In the surrogacy context, the fee paid to the surrogate and her
unequal bargaining position may be sufficient to render her consent
involuntary. Preliminary research indicates that surrogacy candidates
are typically poorly educated, unemployed or receiving public assistance.132 The high fee associated with surrogacy may unduly influence
a financially needy woman's decision to become a surrogate because the
money appears to be so easy to earn. 133 The promise of receiving an
easy $10,000 may cloud the potential surrogate's judgment to the extent
that she is unable to fully appreciate the consequences of her contract-that she is expected to forever relinquish her child once it is
born. 134
Utah law suggests that the policy of the state is to protect volun-

One commentator notes even a woman who has previously given birth "may not be able to
predict her emotional state when the child she has agreed to surrender is born pursuant to the
surrogate parenting agreement." Atwell, supra note 62, at 51-52.
127. "A parent can be unexpectedly smitten with profound connection to the newborn child
at birth, and a parent who tries (for whatever reason) to give a child away, can find it impossible
to go through with the parting." Wolf, Enforcing Surrogate Motherhood Agreements: The
Trouble With Specific Performance, IV N.Y.L. ScH. HuM. R"rs. 375, 400 (1987).
128. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 437, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988)("any decision prior to
the baby's birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed").
129. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 5.1
(1982) [hereinafter 'FARNSWORTH,
CoNTRACTs'].
130. "No legal system devised by man has even been reckless enough to make all promises
enforceable." Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 576, 591 (1969).
131. RESTAH:MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (1979) [hereinafter 'RESTATF.Mt:NT,
CoNTRACTs']. Undue influence is an equitable doctrine that "give[s] relief to victims of unfair
transactions that were induced by improper persuasion." FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS, supra note
130, at § 4.9.
A contract may also be unenforceable when entered into pursuant to duress, RESTATEMENT,
CoNTRACTS§§ 174-76, or mistake, id. at§§ 151-58.
132. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
133. "[T]he monetary incentive to sell her child may, depending on her financial circumstances, make her decision less voluntary." In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 425, 537 A.2d 1227,
1241 (1988).
134. To the extent that the possibility of earning such a high fee does cloud the surrogate's
judgment, it may also prevent her from making an informed decision to become a surrogate. See
supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
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tary consent by prohibiting fees being paid to a parent in order to induce her to relinquish her child for adoption. ~ Some courts have held
that the payment of very small sums in connection with an adoption
were sufficient to render consent involuntary. 136 Therefore, any fee
promised a prospective surrogate should be found to unduly influence
her decision to become a surrogate and sufficient to render her consent
to the agreement involuntary. 137
Advance consent in the form of the surrogacy contract is not possible under the statute for two reasons. First, the statute is plain in requiring that all parties involved in the adoption must appear before the
court to sign the necessary consent forms. Second, pre-birth consent is
not contemplated by the statute. Indeed, the statute contemplates that
the child must be born before consent to adoption may be given. The
statute requires that "(t]he person adopting a child and the child
adopted, and the other persons whose consent is necessary, must appear before the district court" before consent may be given 138 and that
adoption may not take place without the consent of each parent "having
rights in relation to said child .... " 139 Advance consent is not possible
under these statutes because parental rights cannot completely vest until
the child is born. 140
The requirement that all parties to the adoption give their consent
to the adoption before a judge is not served by the surrogacy contract.
The purpose of this requirement is for the judge to satisfy himself that
13

135. See the discussion of Utah's baby-selling statute, supra notes 100-07 and accompanying
text, and the discussion of independent adoptions, supra notes I 08-16 and accompanying text.
136. Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315, 185 S.E.2d (1971)(an offer to pay the mother's
airfare from Georgia to visit her parents in Illinois was sufficient to render consent involuntary);
Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957)(consent was rendered involuntary by the
adoptive parents paying $400 in exchange for the biological parent's consent allowing them to
adopt two children).
137. "[A]ny decision ... compelled by a pre-exisiting contractual committment, the threat of
a lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000 payment, is less than totally voluntary." In re Baby
M, 109 N.J. 396, 437, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988).
138. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-30-4 (1953)(emphasis added).
139. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-30-4(1)(1981).
140. "Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent
and child. They require relationships more enduring." Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260
(1983)(quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)). At issue in Lehr was the time
in which the parental rights of an unwed father may be terminated. The Court determined that an
unwed father's parental rights do not vest until he "demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' .... " /d. at
361. While it is true that the mother's role in procreation and birth establishes some sort of
parental relationship between mother and child, id. at n.l6, it seems that the biological link between mother and child is insufficient to create the full blown parental rights of which the Court
was speaking. Arguably the mother must also accept "some measure of responsibility for the
child's future" in order to enjoy full blown parental rights." /d. at 262.
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the person placing the child for adoption is giving informed and voluntary consent to the adoption. If the judge has any doubt that any element of consent is not satisfied, he may prevent the parent from forever
losing her parental rights. The surrogate's parental rights are. clearly
not protected by the surrogate contract because it attempts to get the
surrogate to consent to an adoption before the surrogate has the opportunity to make an informed and voluntary decision.
The Adoption Law also requires that if written consent of a licensed child-placement agency is not obtained upon the filing of the
adoption petition, that the Division of Family Services shall investigate
the matter and report its findings to the court. 141 The statute requires
the Division of Family Services to determine "whether the proposed
foster parent is financially able and morally fit to have the care, supervision, and training of the child" 142 and "any other facts and circumstances pertaining to the child and his welfare." 143 This "indicate[s] a
legislative intention to assure that a minor child, in an independent
adoption, will be placed with fit and proper parents." 144 Surrogacy
contracts violate this policy because little, if any, effort is expended to
determine the parental fitness of the adopting parent. 1411 Indeed, the
contract's sole purpose is to provide an infertile couple with a baby; not
to seek the best interests of the child.

V.

THE UTAH SuRROGATE PARENTHOOD AcT

The preceding section suggested that surrogacy contracts may already have been prohibited under Utah's baby-selling, child placement,
termination, and adoption laws before the legislature voted to enact the
Surrogate Parenthood Act. These laws, however, did not prohibit surrogacy because the legislature made a conscious policy decision to preclude the practice, rather surrogacy was forbidden indirectly-indeed,
accidentally-by laws that were promulgated to deal with entirely difUTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-30-14 (1985). See Matter of S., 572 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-14(4)(c)(1985).
UTAH CoDE ANN. § 78-30-14(4)(e)(1985).
Matter of S., 572 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 1977).
The New Jersey Supreme Court said of the Baby M contract,
Although the interest of the natural father and adoptive mother is certainly the
predominant interest, realistically the only interest served . . . not even a superficial
attempt is made to determine their awareness of their responsibilities as parents.
Worst of all, however, is the contract's total disregard of the best interests of the
child. There is not the slightest suggestion that any inquiry will be made at any time to
determine the fitness of the Sterns as custodial parents, of Mrs. Stern as an adoptive
parent, their superiority to Mrs. Whitehead, or the effect on the child of not living with
her natural mother.
In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 437, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988)(emphasis in original).
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
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ferent problems. The previous prohibition against surrogacy was not
specific, therefore, it lacked authoritativeness because surrogacy itself
was not directly prohibited. The prohibition also failed to define the
rights of parties involved in surrogate contracts, leaving courts without
legislative guidance as to how custody disputes should be resolved.
The Surrogate Parenthood Act, however, changed this. The Act
explicitly renders both commercial and gratuitous surrogacy unenforceable as violative of public policy, provides criminal liability for all persons and organizations involved in commercial surrogacy, 146 and defines
the status of children born as a result of surrogacy agreements. 147
In light of the potential problems involved in any surrogacy arrangement the Act was long overdue. The Act is justified, if for no
other reason, on the ground that it sends a message to all persons contemplating a surrogate contract that neither commercial nor gratuitous
146. Violation of the Act is considered a class A misdemeanor. UTAH Cmw ANN. § 76-7204( 1)(d)( 1989). A class A misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment for a term of a year or
less. !d. at§ 76-3-204(1)(1973).
147. The Act provides:
( 1)(a) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may be a party to a contract for
which consideration is given, and in which a woman agrees to undergo artificial insemination or other procedures and subsequently terminate her parental rights to a child
born as a result.
(b) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may facilitate a contract prohibited
by Subsection (1 ). This section does not apply to medical care provided after
conception.

(c) Contracts or agreements entered into in violation of this section are null and void,
and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
(2) An agreement which is entered into, without consideration given, in which a woman agrees to undergo artificial insemination or other procedures and subsequently
terminate her parental rights to a child born as a result, is unenforceable.
(3)(a) In any case arising under Subsection (1) or (2), the surrogate mother is the
mother of the child for all legal purposes, and her husban<i, if she is married, is the
father of the child for all legal purposes.
(b) In any custody issue that may arise under Subsection (1) or (2), the court is not
bound by any of the terms of the contract or agreement but shall make its custody
decision based solely on the best interest of the child.
( 4) Nothing in this section prohibits adoptions and adoption services that are in ac('()rdance with the laws of this state.
(5) This section applies to contracts or agreements that are entered into after April 24,
1989, the effective date of this act.
(6)(a) This section is repealed on July 1, 1991.
(b) Prior to January 1, 1991, the Legislative Interim Social Services Committee shall
analyze and assess the current status of surrogacy arrangements and related issues,
including adoption, paternity, custody, support, visitation, and the termination of parental rights, and make its recommendations to the Legislature regarding the policy of
this state and any proposed legislation regulating surrogate parenthood arrangements.
(b) Any incident or arrangement of surrogate parenthood, as described in Subsection
(1) or (2) that occurs prior to July I, 1991 is governed by this section.
UTAH Com: ANN. § 76-7-204 (1989).
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surrogacy will be enforced in the Beehive State. Those contemplating
surrogacy have advance notice as to the consequences of a surrogate
relationship and are not left wondering whether the policy of the state
permits or forbids the practice. Infertile Utahns wishing to employ a
surrogate must either find a woman willing to bear the child for free,
and take the risk that she will breach her agreement, or go out of state
and take their chances with the laws and policies of other jurisdictions.
Perhaps one of the most important provisions of the Act, besides
rendering surrogacy unenforceable, is the presumption that a child born
to a surrogate is legally the child of the surrogate and her husband. 148
This provision legitimizes 149 a child born as a result of an illegal commercial contract or legal gratuitous contract, and provides further protection to the child by determining ultimate parental responsibility in
the event that either party breaches the agreement after the child is
born. 150 The section does not provide a similar presumption as to the
child's paternity when the surrogate is unmarried, even though it does
provide that the child is legally the surrogate's. 151 This may not be a
significant problem, however, because people seem to prefer that the
surrogate be married anyway. 152 But to the extent that single surrogates are used, this section has the effect of bastardizing the child of a
single surrogate who decides to keep the child for herself. 153 Whether
148. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(a)(1989). It is interesting to note that Utah has not
adopted the Uniform Parentage Act. Section 5 of that Act provides that a husband will be treated
as the natural father of a child born to his wife when he has consented to her being artificially
inseminated with donor sperm. Because surrogates normally conceive by means of artificial insemination, the above cited section of the Utah Surrogate Parenthood Act seems to suggest that a
married woman, who is artificially inseminated with donor sperm, gives birth to a legitimate child
whether or not her husband consented to the insemination, and both her and her husband are
legally the parents of that child. It is questionable whether this is the Utah Legislature's intended
result.
149. At common law an illegitimate child had few rights. An illegitimate was not entitled to
support from her parents nor was she entitled to an inheritance. In addition, she was considered to
be without heirs, except for those of her own body. Today, however, the status of illegitimate
children has significantly improved, although an illegitimate child is still not entitled to support or
an inheritance from her father unless he takes action to legitimize her, or she brings a paternity
action against him. See generally B.Y.U. J LEGAL STUD., SUMMARY OF UTAH fAMILY LAW§§
20.2-20.5 (1980).
ISO. UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 76-7-204(3)(a)(1989).
151. /d.
152. See supra note 24.
153. This is arguably no different than the status of a child born to an unwed mother. Both
are illegitimate. However, in the latter case, the putative father can legitimize the child by marrying the child's mother, UTAH ConE ANN.§ 77-60-14 (1978), or by publicly acknowledging the
child as his own. UTAH ConE ANN. § 78-30-12 (1977). If the single surrogate reneges on her
agreement and keeps her child it is likely that the child will remain illegitimate unless the father is
willing to publicly acknowledge it as his own. It seems highly unlikely that the father would ever
be willing to do this, especially in light of the agreement's breach. However, Utah law does permit
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or not this problem is one that can be resolved is something the legislature will have the chance to deal with when the Act expires. 154
It is significant that the Act provides that courts are to ignore the
terms of the contract and look only to the best interests of the child in
resolving custody disputes. 11111 This should be self-evident, given the fact
that the court is making a decision that will affect an innocent child's
future. However, the trial court's decision in the Baby M case illustrates too well that the judge may place more importance on the surrogate contract than on the best interests of a child created under the
contract. 156 This provision reflects a policy decision that the best interests of a child should not be determined by self-interested participants
to a contract, but rather on the basis of an impartial judicial decision
made after the child's birth and after reviewing all of the relevant facts
that could affect that child.
The biggest problem with the Act is that it is temporary. 157 Because of this it provides no guidance as to the long term policy of the
state regarding the practice of surrogacy. This may cause some
problems for people contemplating surrogate motherhood after the Act's
repeal and, once again, place the courts in the awkward and difficult
position of trying to decide what laws apply to this unique arrangement. Before the Act was adopted, a good argument could be made that
surrogacy was already prohibited by the baby-selling statute as well as
a combination of the adoption, child placement and termination statutes.158 The current Act plainly supercedes the above combination of
statutes, because it is specifically designed to prohibit the practice as
one that is against public policy; therefore, the official attitude of the
state towards surrogacy is no longer left to inference. However, once
the Act is repealed, infertile couples will once again be left to infer
what the policy of the state actually is.
Because the Act is ambiguous, two inferences are possible. First,
one could infer that the above mentioned combination of statutes will
continue to prohibit the practice in the absence of a specific act. This
may not be a plausible inference, however, because the legislature
failed to state in the current Act whether it considered surrogacy to be
baby-selling or something that could otherwise be prohibited by other
statutes. Second, because the legislature prohibited surrogacy and then
an illegitimate to bring a paternity action against its putative father and to sue for support.
CooE ANN. §§ 78-45a-2 and 78-45a-5 (1977).
154. See UTAH Com: ANN. § 76-7-204(6)(1989).
155. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(b)(1989).
156. See In re Baby M, 217 N.J.Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (1987).
157. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 76-7-204(6)(1989). For the text see supra note 147.
158. See supra notes I 00-45 and accompanying text.
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repealed the prohibition, it is also possible to infer that the practice
after repeal is legal and not subject to regulation by the previously
mentioned statutes. The second inference seems to be more sound.
That the legislature chose to prohibit surrogacy for only two years
is disappointing. Presumably this will give the Legislative Interim Social Services Committee two additional years 1119 to analyze the effect of
this new Act on surrogacy to determine whether the Act accomplishes
its objectives and should be retained, whether it should be more strict,
or whether it should be totally repealed in favor of an act merely regulating surrogacy instead of proscribing it. Arguably, there may be some
benefits to be gained in having the legislature readdress this issue again
in 1991. Perhaps by then surrogacy will be a more accepted means of
helping infertile couples cope with childlessness. However, until such
time, for the sake of predictability, the law should be on the books indefinitely and the burden placed on the proponents of surrogacy to
prove that the practice is in line with sound public policy.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Although this Act is a step in the right direction, it is unfortunate
that an attempt to give clear definition to the state's existing policy is
given such a limited duration. Hopefully, the legislature will rectify
this problem by realizing that the repeal of the Act in 1991 will revert
the surrogacy laws to a point less certain than they were in 1988 and
enact long term legislation to prohibit the practice. 160 Such a broad pro159. Why the legislature would feel that they need an additional two years to study surrogacy is a mystery. In 1988 the House of Representatives established a Surrogate Parenthood Study
Committee for the purpose of studying the issues surrounding surrogacy for eight months. The
Committee was composed of qualified representatives from the Department of Health, the Department of Social Services, the Utah Hospital Association, the Utah Medical Association, the
Attorney General's Office, in addition to senators, representatives, and a medical ethics expert.
The purpose of the Committee was to (1) consider whether public policy would permit surrogate
contracts, (2) seek input from medical and ethics experts, as well as religious organizations, (3)
consider the competency of the courts to adjudicate surrogacy controversies, and (4) consider
whether legislative action is necessary to regulate the practice, and if so, to recommend surrogacy
legislation. UTAH LEGIS. Rt:P. §§ 63-70-1 and 63-70-2 (1988).
160. Under the present Act, toleration of gratuitous surrogacy may be justified because fewer
risks are involved.
The potential for commodification is avoided, and the potential for exploitation is minimized. Because gratuitous surrogacy arrangements usually occur among friends or relatives, the likelihood of breaches is greatly reduced. Accordingly, enforcement problems
rarely occur. In fact, an understanding between sisters or intimate friends probably is
not cast in the matrix of a contract at all. 'Philanthropic' surrogacy, then, is virtually
benign and its suppression advances no weighty state interest.
Commercial Conceptions, supra note 18, at 152-53. Nevertheless, this fails to take into account
the risks to the mental health of the surrogate, her family, the adopting couple, and the child. See
supra notes 94-97. However, since the legislature has expressed an interest in studying surrogacy
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hibition may be painful for childless couples, however, the risks that
are attendant in surrogacy place a greater potential for pain on the
child thus conceived. There should be no question as to which party is
better able to cope with this sort of psychological pam.

jason C. DeMille

further, it should also consider whether it wishes to retain this exception to the law if it continues
to prohibit surrogacy generally.

